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I.

INTRODUCTION

Under the First Amendment, “[t]he method for protecting
freedom of worship and freedom of conscience in religious matters is quite
the reverse” of that used to protect general freedom of speech. 1 Unlike with
speech, 2 the government generally does not participate in religious dialogue
ǂ

J.D. Candidate 2021 at Mitchell Hamline School of Law. The author would like to first
thank Professor Raleigh Levine and Professor Mike Steenson for their guidance, support,
and mentorship not only on this article but throughout her entire law school career. The
author would also like to say a special thank you to her family, friends, and mentors for
everything ever; as the great Elle Woods once said, “We did it!”
Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 591 (1992).
City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 51–52 (1986) (upholding a zoning
ordinance prohibiting adult motion picture theaters from being within 1,000 feet of any
residential zone, single or multiple family dwelling, church, park, or school); R.A.V. v. City
of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 384–86 (1992) (holding a city ordinance prohibiting people from
things like burning a cross or putting up a Nazi swastika was unconstitutional because by
1
2
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or debate, as “the Framers deemed religious establishment antithetical to
the freedom of all.” 3 Where the Free Exercise Clause embraces freedom of
conscience and worship parallel to the speech provisions of the First
Amendment, the Establishment Clause specifically prohibits “state
intervention in religious affairs.” 4 Yet courts have long recognized that “there
is room for play in the joints” between the Establishment Clause and the
Free Exercise Clause. 5
While the Supreme Court does not recognize the right to public
education as a fundamental right, 6 the plaintiffs in Espinoza v. Montana
Department of Revenue asked the Court to recognize an analogous right: a
fundamental right to funding private religious education. 7 Framed as a
violation of the petitioners’ free exercise rights, the petitioners in Espinoza
alleged that the Montana Department of Revenue infringed their right by
excluding private religious schools from a tax credit program, 8 and the
Supreme Court agreed. 9
regulating some fighting words more strictly than others, the government shows hostility or
favoritism towards the underlying message); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448–49
(1969) (finding that the Ohio Criminal Syndicalism Act violated the First Amendment
because it punished mere advocacy for a type of action without distinguishing it from
incitement to imminent lawless action).
Lee, 505 U.S. at 591.
3
4

Id.

Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 718 (2004) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n of New York,
397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970)). In Walz, a real estate owner sought an injunction to prevent the
New York courts from granting property tax exemptions to religious organizations for
religious properties used solely for religious worship. Walz, 397 U.S. at 666. The owner
argued that the grant of an exemption to church property indirectly required him to make a
contribution to religious bodies, thus violating the Establishment Clause. Id. at 667. The
Court importantly noted the room to “play in the joints” and required value judgments under
the Religion Clauses to turn on “whether particular acts in question [were] intended to
establish or interfere with religious beliefs and practices or have the effect of doing so.” Id.
at 669. The Supreme Court determined that the tax exemption did not violate the First
Amendment’s Religion Clauses. Id. at 680.
San Antonio Index. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973) (“Education, of course,
is not among the rights afforded explicit protection under our Federal Constitution. Nor do
we find any basis for saying it is implicitly so protected.”).
Reply Brief for Petitioners at 23–24, Espinoza v. Montana Dep’t of Rev., 140 S. Ct. 2246
(2020) (No.18-1195), 2019 WL 6726413, at *22 (explaining the history and tradition of
similar No-Aid clauses and asking the Court to end the national tradition of religious
discrimination).
Espinoza v. Montana Dep't of Rev., 435 P.3d 603, 607–08 (Mont. 2018), cert. granted, 139
S. Ct. 2777 (2019), rev’d, 140 S. Ct. 2246 (2020) (referencing MONT. CONST. art. X, § 6
(West, Westlaw through 2019)) (“The legislature, counties, cities, towns, school districts, and
public corporations shall not make any direct or indirect appropriation or payment from any
public fund or monies, or any grant of lands or other property for any sectarian purpose or
to aid any church, school, academy, seminary, college, university, or other literary or
scientific institution, controlled in whole or in part by any church, sect, or denomination.”).
Espinoza v. Montana Dep’t of Rev., 140 S. Ct. 2246, 2262–63 (2020).
5

6

7

8

9
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This paper proposes that while Montana’s scholarship tuition tax
credit program 10 advances religion and would lead to excessive government
entanglement with religion in violation of the Establishment Clause, the
Court erred in its reasoning. The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment
are not the proper precedential pathway. The Court’s past decisions
regarding the Free Exercise and Establishment Clause are so narrow and
limited in scope that Espinoza was best decided elsewhere. Montana’s
scholarship program should be subject to rational basis review because there
was no infringement of a fundamental right. Funds are not fundamental.
This paper begins by discussing the history of the freedom of
religion, specifically the free exercise rights and anti-establishment provision
of the First Amendment. 11 Next, this paper will discuss Espinoza v. Montana
Department of Revenue. 12 Finally, this paper will argue that Espinoza should
have been decided in favor of the Montana Department of Revenue
because the fundamental right to free exercise of religion does not include
a right to funding. 13
II.

HISTORY OF FREEDOM OF RELIGION

As the first portion of the First Amendment, the Establishment
Clause and Free Exercise Clause share in subject literally and
metaphorically. 14 Justice Rutledge noted, “‘[r]eligion’ appears only once in
the [First] Amendment. But the word governs two prohibitions and governs
them alike.” 15 However, as precedent demonstrates, while these two clauses
are often analyzed together, the interpretation of them, together and apart,
varies. This section begins by discussing the Framers’ approaches to
Constitutional analysis requires examination of the relationship form “for the light that it
casts on the substance.” Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S.
756, 790 (1973) (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971)). Here the relationship
between the tax credit program and the substance is clear. The program is a tuition credit.
First, individuals receive tax credits for donating to nonprofit student scholarship
organizations. Brief of Respondents at 3, Espinoza v. Montana Dep’t of Rev., 140 S. Ct. 2246
(2020) (No.18-1195) 2019 WL 5887033, at *3. Next, these organizations use the donations
to fund scholarships for qualified education providers. Id. at 4. The substance is made clear
by the fact that the petitioners relied on the tax credit to create financial aid to allow them to
send their children to these religious private schools. Reply Brief for Petitioners, supra note
7, at 7.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.
See U.S. CONST. amend. I. The structure of the First Amendment is that “of religion”
describes both the first clause, which is that Congress may not make laws respecting
establishment of religion, and the second clause. Separated by a comma and not a semicolon, the Free Exercise Clause builds off of the Establishment Clause in sentence structure
literally.
Everson v. Board of Educ. of Ewing Twp., 330 U.S. 1, 32 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
10

11
12
13
14

15
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religion, which serves as a starting point for understanding modern
precedent. Next, this section looks at key cases implicating both the
Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause.

A.

Framers’ Approach to Free Exercise and the Establishment Clause

In analyzing the “play in the joints” between the Free Exercise
Clause and the Establishment Clause, it makes sense to begin by assessing
the schools of thought that influenced the drafters of the First Amendment. 16
There were three dominant perspectives regarding the relationship between
the government and religion among the Framers: the Evangelical view, the
Jeffersonian view, and the Madisonian view. 17
The Evangelical view, championed by Roger Williams, believed
that “worldly corruptions . . . might consume the churches if sturdy fences
against the wilderness were not maintained.” 18 Those in this school of
thought were concerned “that government involvement with religion would
corrupt and undermine religion.” 19
In contrast to the Evangelical view, Jefferson believed religion
“should be walled off from the state in order to safeguard secular interests .
. . against ecclesiastical depredations and incursions.” 20 The Jeffersonian
view stands for the “fear that religion would corrupt and undermine the
government.” 21
Madison landed somewhere between Williams and Jefferson. 22
The Madisonian view believed that religious and secular interests “would be
advanced best by diffusing and decentralizing power so as to assure
competition among sects” and avoid dominance. 23 Madison opposed “every
form and degree of official relation between religion and civil authority” as
“religion was a wholly private matter beyond the scope of civil power either
to restrain or to support.” 24
Though differing in their reasoning, each view expresses a desire
to prevent entanglement of religion with government. The Framers sought
Larry R. Thaxton, Silence Begets Religion: Bown v. Gwinnett County School District and
the Unconstitutionality of Moments of Silence in Public Schools, 57 OHIO ST. L. J. 1399,

16

1400 (1996).
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 1723 (5th ed.
2015).
Id. (quoting LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1158-1159 (2d ed.
1988)).
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. (quoting TRIBE, supra note 18, at 1159).
17

18

19
20
21
22
23

Id.
See id. at 1723–24.
Id. (quoting TRIBE, supra note 18, at 1159).

Everson v. Board of Educ. of Ewing Twp., 330 U.S. 1, 39–40 (1947) (Rutlegde, J.,
dissenting).

24
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to separate the concerns of government from the concerns of individual
religious communities. The Framers enumerated this desire in the Religion
Clauses of the First Amendment. The clauses act as a double-edged sword,
prohibiting establishment of religion, but protecting the free exercise
thereof. 25

B.

Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist

26

In Nyquist, the Supreme Court struck down two provisions of a
New York statute related to aid for nonpublic schools as it violated the
Establishment Clause. 27
The New York statute established financial aid programs for
nonpublic elementary and secondary schools. 28 The first section at issue
provided direct monetary grants from the state to qualifying nonpublic
schools for the maintenance and repair of school facilities. 29 Qualifying
schools were nonpublic, nonprofit schools designated as serving a high
concentration of low-income families. 30 Maintenance and repair included
provision of heat, light, water, ventilation, sanitary facilities, cleaning
services, snow removal, and “such other items as the commissioner may
deem necessary to ensure the health, welfare and safety of enrolled pupils.” 31
The second issue was a two-part program created by the New
York statute: a tuition grant program and a tax benefit program. 32 First, the
plan provided tuition reimbursement to parents of children attending
nonpublic elementary and secondary schools if they also met the income
requirement. 33 Second, the plan provided tax relief to parents of children
attending nonpublic elementary and secondary schools who failed to qualify
for tuition reimbursement. 34 The statute allowed parents to subtract a
designated amount from their adjusted gross incomes per each dependent
the parent paid at least $50 for in nonpublic school tuition. 35

Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 350 F. Supp. 655, 669 (S.D.N.Y.
1972), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
See id. (finding the provisions violated the Establishment Clause because the statute’s
primary effect was to advance religion).
Id. at 761–62.
Id. at 762.
Id. at 762–63.
Id. at 763.
Id. at 764.
Id. To qualify for a tuition reimbursement the parent needed to have a taxable income
under $5,000. Id.
Id. at 765.
Id. The program adjusted the amount allowed based on income. Id. For example, if a
taxpayer’s adjusted gross income was less than $9,000 that taxpayer could subtract $1,000 for
25

26
27

28
29
30
31
32
33

34
35

2020]

FUNDAMENTAL FUNDS

69

New York residents sought to enjoin the state from approving or
paying any funds, or according tax benefits under the statute, arguing that
the three provisions violated the Establishment Clause. 36
The district court found the maintenance and repair grants and
tuition reimbursement grants violated the Establishment Clause, but that the
tax credit did not violate the Establishment Clause. 37
As to the maintenance and repair portion, the district court
accepted the intent as secular but found that the provision had the effect of
advancing religion. 38 The provision involved continuing financial and
political relationships and dependencies between the schools and the state. 39
The court hypothesized that if it allowed a public subsidy for janitorial
services for nonpublic schools, the next step may be to supply desks,
blackboards, and even a portion of the building because those items are not
“religious in character.” 40
The court struck down the tuition reimbursement, noting that a
“[s]tate-supported church school is simply not a part of our way of life, and
the payment of tuition for its pupils makes the church school a [s]tatesupported school.” 41 The court held that “a subsidy to those who practice a
particular religion to enable them to observe its tenets is not compatible with
either clause of the First Amendment.” 42 The state argued that its program
was constitutional because it reimbursed poor parents and allowed them to
exercise their constitutional right of free exercise. 43 However, the court
noted that if it accepted this argument that “[i]f conditions worsen, it would
be proper, under this argument, to pay the salaries of the secular teachers.” 44
Thus court rejected the state’s argument, as it feared that expanding the
meaning of the Establishment Clause in this case may lead to a point where
the state supports and controls parochial schools. 45

as many as three dependents. Id. As adjusted gross income rises, the amount deductible
decreases. Id.
Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 768–69.
36
37

Id.

Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 350 F. Supp. 655, 667 (S.D.N.Y.
1972).
Id. (quoting Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 688 (1971)).
Id. at 666.
Id. at 669.
Id. The court continued, hypothesizing that if a state may give a subsidy for religious
education, that it may then be able to give a subsidy to purchase sacramental wine or a
crucifix, or for a trip to a religious event, or even for a Muslim to take a pilgrimage to Mecca.
38

39
40
41
42

Id.
Id.
Id. at 670.
Id. (noting that “Once we embark upon such a course, we fear that the meaning of the
43
44
45

Establishment Clause will be diluted to the point where the State will support the parochial
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The court upheld the tax credit and distinguished it from the
other provisions in the statute. 46 First, the court found that the tax credit was
not restricted to areas containing only Catholic religiously affiliated
schools. 47 The credit covered attendance at all nonprofit private schools in
the state of New York. 48
Next, the court noted that the tax credit did not involve a subsidy
or monetary grant from the state treasury to the schools or the families. 49
Unlike the maintenance and repair provision and the reimbursement
provision, the tax credit involved no receipt of money from the
government. 50 Instead, the tax credit allowed for a decrease in taxable
income for filing and tax return purposes. 51 The court found that precedent
made a distinction between direct grants of public funds and tax exemptions,
which are generally permitted. 52
The court also noted that the provision recompensed citizens who
bear the burden of maintaining public schools, but who, for religious or
other reasons, send their children to nonpublic schools. 53 The court noted
that lightening the tax burden for those who contribute to public education
but derive no benefit from it is a legitimate legislative purpose, comparing it
to the school tax exemption for the childless or aged. 54 Lastly, the court
noted that the benefit to parochial schools was so remote that it did not
involve impermissible financial aid to schools. 55 Thus, there was limited
administrative entanglement with the tax credit provision. 56
The Supreme Court began its analysis by noting that
Establishment Clause precedent requires careful examination of laws to
ascertain whether the law furthers “any of the evils against which that clause
protects” like “sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of the
[government] in religious activity.” 57

schools with the inevitable control by the State built into an anomalous situation. That is a
condition devoutly not to be wished.”).

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 670–71.
Id. at 659.
Id. at 671.
Id. at 670–71.
Id. at 673.
Id. at 671 (noting that “the income tax exemption (which is in effect a tax credit since the
exemption is not intended to equal the parents’ outlay) is to individuals, not to churches or

46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55

church schools, a step removed.”).
56

Id.

Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 772 (1973)
(quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'm. of the City of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970)).
57
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The Court accepted New York’s secular legislative purpose for all
three provisions. 58 The Court noted New York’s interests in “preserving a
healthy and safe educational environment,” “promoting pluralism and
diversity,” and its concern for its overburdened system were sufficient
secular purposes under the Lemon test. 59
Next, the Court weighed each provision against the final two
prongs of the Lemon test: primary effect and entanglement. 60 The Court
found that the maintenance and repair provision failed the second prong
because it effectively subsidized and advanced religion. 61 The Court noted
that the payments were not restricted to upkeep of facilities used for secular
purposes, adding that it may be impossible to restrict funds in that manner. 62
The Court compared the maintenance and repair provision to a funds for
construction of a facility, finding that if a state may not erect buildings where
religious activities may take place, the state may not maintain or renovate
them either. 63
Justice Powell’s majority opinion found that the tuition
reimbursement program also failed the primary effects portion of the
Lemon test. 64 The tuition reimbursement provision did not guarantee the
separation between secular and religious educational functions. 65 The Court
held that the state sought to relieve the financial burdens of parents that send
their children to private schools to “assure that they continue to have the
option to send their children to religion-oriented schools.” 66 Though aid to
perpetuate pluralistic education and protect overburdened schools are
58
59

Id. at 773.
Id. (discussing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971)) (establishing a three-part

test to determine whether the law in question passes muster under the Establishment Clause).
The Court defined the three-part test, outlined in Lemon, as first, a secular legislative
purpose, second, “a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion,” and third, that
the statute “must avoid excessive government entanglement with religion.” Id.
Id. at 774.
Id. at 779–80.
Id. at 774.
Id. at 776–77. The Court found Tilton v. Richardson to be instructive and persuasive on
this issue. Id. at 775. In Tilton, the Court upheld federal grants to be used for construction
of facilities for “clearly secular purposes by public and nonpublic institutions.” Id. (reviewing
Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971)). In Tilton, the government was entitled, under
the clause of a federal statute, to recover portions of its grants in the event the facility was
used to advance religion. See Tilton, 403 U.S. at 682. The provision was initially set to expire
at the end of a twenty-year period, but the Court struck that portion down as it would open
the facility to sectarian use after that period. See id. at 683. The Court drew the conclusion
that if funds may not be granted to build a facility that may be used for sectarian purposes in
twenty years, they may not be distributed to maintain and repair facilities without limiting
their use to secular purposes. See id.
Nyquist at 780.
Id. at 783.
60
61
62
63

64
65
66

Id.
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compelling, the Court held that “the effect of the aid [was] unmistakably to
provide desired financial support for nonpublic, sectarian institutions.” 67
The Court held the tax credit provision had the impermissible
effect of advancing the sectarian activities of religious schools. 68 The tax
deduction flowed primarily to the parents of children attending sectarian
nonpublic schools. 69 The Court also noted that there was little difference in
determining effect between the tax benefit and the tuition grant. 70 Under
both the reimbursement program and tax benefit program, parents received
the same form of encouragement and reward for sending their children to
nonpublic schools. 71 The only difference was that one received actual
payment from the state while the other reduced the sum they would
otherwise be obliged to pay the state. 72 Despite the difference in form, the
Court held both provisions violated the effects test for the same underlying
reasons. 73

C.

Zelman v. Simmons-Harris

74

In Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, the Supreme Court held that
Ohio’s Pilot Scholarship Program did not violate the Establishment
Clause. 75 Ohio established its Pilot Project Scholarship Program to provide
families in the Cleveland City School District with educational choices. 76
The Cleveland City School District failed to meet any state standards for
minimal acceptable performance and more than two-thirds of the high
school students dropped out or failed before graduation. 77
Ohio’s scholarship program provided two kinds of assistance.
The first part of the program provided tuition aid for students that attended
a public or private school of their family’s choosing for kindergarten through
third grade, the program subsequently expanded to include children up to
the eighth grade. 78 The program allowed any private school, whether
religious or not, to participate in the program and accept students if it was
located in the boundaries of the district and met statewide educational
standards. 79 The private schools were required to agree not to discriminate
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79

Id.
Id. at 794.
Id.
Id. at 790–91.
Id. at 791.
Id.
Id.

536 U.S. 639 (2002).

Id. at 662.
Id. at 644.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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based on race, religion, or ethnicity. 80 Additionally, private schools had to
agree not to advocate or foster unlawful behavior and refrain from teaching
hatred based on race, ethnicity, nationality, or religion. 81 Any public school
located in a school district adjacent to the covered district was also eligible
to participate in the program. 82
Ohio distributed aid to parents according to financial need, giving
priority to families below 200% of the poverty line. 83 These parents were
“eligible to receive 90 percent of private school tuition up to $2,250.” 84 Also,
private schools could not charge these parents a copay greater than $250. 85
All other parents were eligible to receive 75% of tuition up to
$1,875. 86 However, these families only received tuition aid if the number of
low-income children participating was less than the number of available
scholarships. 87 There was no copay cap for these parents. 88
Second, the program provided tutorial aid for students who
remained enrolled in public schools. 89 Through this part of the program,
parents arranged for registered tutors to assist their children and then
submitted bills to Ohio for payment. 90
The program began operating during the 1996 to 1997 school
year. 91 During the 1999 to 2000 school year, fifty-six private schools
participated and forty-six of them were religiously affiliated. 92 Of the students
participating in the program, 96% enrolled in religiously affiliated schools. 93
A group of Ohio taxpayers challenged the program in state court
in 1996. 94 The Ohio Supreme Court rejected the federal claims and held
that the enactment of the program violated procedural requirements of
Ohio’s Constitution. 95 Ohio’s legislature cured the defects found, so only
the basic provisions of the program remained intact. 96 In 1999, the same

80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 646.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 647.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 648.
Id.
Id.
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group of Ohio taxpayers filed an action in United States district court to
enjoin the reenacted program, arguing it violated the Establishment Clause. 97
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Ohio
taxpayers. 98 The court began its analysis by looking at the history of the
Establishment Clause, noting that the Supreme Court generally holds that
government may not provide scholarship assistance to students supporting
religious instruction or indoctrination. 99 The district court added that
scholarships are approved where the aid is part of a “program made
generally available without regard to the public-nonpublic or sectariannonsectarian nature of the schools.” 100 In those cases, there is no religious
indoctrination attributable to the government; it is private choice of the aid
recipient. 101
In analyzing the parties’ claims, the district court applied the
Lemon test, as reaffirmed by the Court in Agostini v. Felton. 102 The district
court noted that Agostini collapsed the Lemon test into two prongs and
divided the second prong into three sub-parts. 103 Thus, a “challenged
governmental aid passes constitutional muster if it does not: ‘result in
governmental indoctrination; define its recipients by reference to religion;
or create an excessive entanglement.’” 104
The district court concluded that while Agostini no longer
applied an absolute ban on direct aid supporting religious institutions under
the Establishment Clause, the circumstances where aid is permissible still
would not include Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v.
Nyquist, which the court concluded was factually indistinguishable from the
case at hand. 105
The district court analyzed Ohio’s program under the Agostini
standard, and found that the program “[ran] afoul of both the indoctrination
prong and the financial incentives prong of the effects test.” 106 Ohio’s
program was not neutrally available without regard to religious-nonreligious,
public-nonpublic nature of schools benefitted. 107 First, there were very few
97
98
99
100

Id.
Id.

Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 72 F. Supp. 2d 834, 843 (N.D. Ohio 1999).
Id. at 844.

Id.
Id. (citing Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 234 (1997)).
Id.
Id. (quoting Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 234 (1997)).
Id. at 859. The Ohio taxpayers argued that Ohio’s Pilot Program was unconstitutional
under Nyquist because it was factually indistinguishable from the program in Nyquist. Id. at

101
102
103
104
105

844. They argued that the program had the effect of advancing religion, thus failing the
second prong of the Lemon test. Id. at 845. The government contended that Ohio’s program
was dissimilar and should be assessed in light of more recent Supreme Court cases. Id.
Id. at 859.

106
107

Id.
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nonreligious options available to eligible students, so the court concluded
that it was not possible to say the decision to attend a religious school was
made as a result of the “genuinely independent choice of aid recipients.” 108
Also, there were no limitations on how schools could use the funds, nor
safeguards to ensure secular instruction. 109 Next, the court found that Ohio’s
program incentivized students to attend religious schools because the
program required that students attend a participating school and the
overwhelming majority of those schools were religiously affiliated. 110
On appeal, a panel for the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed the district court’s decision. 111 In its analysis, the court noted that
the Lemon test is regularly used in the context of schools and education and
that cases like Agostini demonstrate the test’s flexibility. 112
The Sixth Circuit then compared the program in Ohio to the
program in Nyquist, finding it to be the most persuasive and “on point with
the matter at hand.” 113 The court noted that, factually, Ohio’s program
paralleled the tuition reimbursement program in Nyquist. 114 Both programs
provided for parents to receive government funds, either directly as
payment for tuition or as reimbursement. 115 Additionally, both programs did
not include provisions guaranteeing that the funds would be used exclusively
for neutral and nonideological purposes. 116 Lastly, neither program
restricted religious schools’ use of tuition, finding that “the funds may be
used for religious instruction or materials as easily as for erasers and
playground equipment.” 117
The Sixth Circuit concluded that the “alleged choice afforded [to]
both public and private school participants . . . [was] illusory.” 118 No public
schools outside of Cleveland registered in the school voucher program, and
there were no spaces available for children who wished to attend suburban
public schools under the program. 119 Ultimately, the appellate court held
that the Establishment Clause is violated when “the government has
established a program which does not permit private citizens to direct
108
109
110

Id.
Id.
Id. at 860.

Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 234 F.3d 945, 948 (6th Cir. 2000).
Id. at 952–53. The court noted that Agostini introduced components that are aspects of
the Lemon test, but that precedent is not limited only to those components. Id. at 953. The
court added that other components previously utilized by the Supreme Court could be
relevant in assessing a claim under the Lemon test. Id.
Id. at 953.
Id. at 958.

111
112

113
114
115
116
117
118
119

Id.
Id.
Id. at 959.
Id.
Id.
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government aid freely as is their private choice, but which restricts their
choice to a panoply of religious institutions and spaces with only a few
alternative possibilities.” 120
The Supreme Court subsequently reversed the Sixth Circuit’s
decision. 121 The Court noted that the first prong of the Lemon test was
satisfied because the statute was “enacted for the valid secular purpose of
providing educational assistance to poor children in a demonstrably failing
public school system.” 122
Thus, the primary question was whether the Ohio program had
the effect of advancing or inhibiting religion. 123 After assessing precedent, the
Court concluded that “where a government aid program is neutral with
respect to religion, and provides assistance to a broad class of citizens who .
. . direct government aid to religious schools wholly as a result of their own
genuine and independent private choice,” the program is not subject to
challenge under the Establishment Clause. 124 The Court upheld Ohio’s
program, holding that it was entirely neutral with respect to religion because
it provided “benefits directly to a wide spectrum of individuals, defined only
by financial need and residence in a particular school district.” 125
The Supreme Court strayed from the lower court’s analysis and declined to
look at Nyquist as determinative. 126 The Court noted that the two programs
are dissimilar, as the program in Nyquist gave benefits exclusively to private
schools and parents of private school students. 127 Also, in Nyquist, the Court
expressly reserved judgment with respect to cases involving public assistance
“made available generally and without regard to sectarian-nonsectarian, or
public-nonpublic nature of the institution benefited.” 128
The Supreme Court found Ohio’s program to be one of “true
private choice.” 129 The Court noted that the program permitted participation
of all schools within the Cleveland City School district, religious or
nonreligious. 130 The program similarly determined eligibility on neutral
terms without reference to religion, using income as the primary factor in
determining eligibility. 131
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128

Id. at 960.

Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002).

Id. at 649.
Id.
Id. at 652.
Id. at 662.
Id. at 661.
Id.
Id. (quoting Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 782–

83 (1973)).
Id. at 653.
Id. at 652.
Id. at 653.

129
130
131
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Next, the Supreme Court held that Ohio’s program did not
provide financial incentives to skew the program towards religious schools. 132
In fact, the Court determined that Ohio’s program disincentivized religious
schools. 133 Private schools received only half of the assistance given to
community schools and one-third of the assistance given to magnet
schools. 134 Also, parents that chose to send their children to private schools
paid a portion of the school’s tuition while families at public or magnet
schools paid no tuition. 135
The Court rejected the argument that Ohio’s program created the
public perception that Ohio endorsed religious practices or beliefs. 136 The
Court concluded that any objective observer familiar with the history and
context of Ohio’s program would reasonably view the program as “one
aspect of a broader undertaking to assist poor children in failed schools, not
as an endorsement of religious schooling in general.” 137
Though forty-six of the fifty-six participating private schools were
religious, the Court did not find an Establishment Clause violation. 138 The
Court believed the question should be whether Ohio coerced parents into
sending their children to religious schools, not whether it had the effect of
advancing religion. 139

D. Locke v. Davey

140

In Locke v. Davey, the Rehnquist Court held that the state of
Washington’s Promise Scholarship Program was constitutional despite
including a provision that a scholarship recipient could not pursue a degree
in devotional theology. 141
Washington’s Promise Scholarship Program assisted highachieving students that may not otherwise have the financial ability to attend
Id.
Id. at 654.
Id. In the dissent, Justice Souter argued that the program was not neutral because
participating students could not spend their scholarship vouchers at public schools. Id. at
132
133
134

690 n.3. The majority opinion rejected this reasoning because students enrolled at public
schools received tutoring aid, which was almost twice as much funding as the students who
chose to attend private schools. Id. at 654.
135
136
137
138
139

Id.
Id.
Id. at 655.
Id.
Id. at 655–56. In his dissent, Justice Souter argued that because more private religious

schools participated, the program “discouraged participation of private nonreligious
schools.” Id. at 656. However, the majority opinion rejected this argument as well because
the amount of religiously affiliated schools “did not arise as a result of the program,” but
rather, is a phenomenon common to many cities. Id. at 657.
540 U.S. 712 (2004).
Id. at 715.
140
141
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college. 142 Eligible students needed to meet a number of requirements. First,
the student needed to graduate from a Washington high school in the top
15% of their class or obtain at least a set minimum on college admissions
tests. 143 Next, the student’s family income could not be more than 135% of
Washington’s median income. 144 Lastly, and at issue in this case, was the
requirement that the student enroll at least half time at an eligible in-state
postsecondary institution and not pursue a degree in devotional theology
while receiving the scholarship. 145 Though not defined by the statute, the
parties agreed that it codified Washington’s constitutional prohibition on
providing funding for students pursuing degrees “devotional in nature or
designed to induce religion faith.” 146
Davey sued various Washington officials seeking to enjoin
Washington from refusing to award the scholarship solely because a student
pursues a devotional theology degree. 147 Davey argued Washington violated
the Free Exercise, Establishment, and Free Speech Clauses by denying him
the scholarship money based on his decision to pursue a devotional
theology degree. 148
However, the district court rejected Davey’s constitutional claims,
granting summary judgment in favor of the State. 149 As to Davey’s
Establishment Clause challenge, the court rejected his claim that the
Establishment Clause required Washington to fund religious education. 150
Looking to Maine’s Supreme Court, the district court stated that the
Establishment Clause does not require government assistance to make the
practice of religion more available or easier. 151

142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149

Id. at 715–16.
Id. at 716.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing WASH. CONST. art. I, § 11).
Id. at 718.
Id.
Id.

Order Denying Plaintiff's and Granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment,
Davey v. Locke, No. C00-61R, 2000 WL 35505408 at *5 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 5, 2000).
Id. (citing Bagley v. Raymond Sch. Dep’t., 728 A.2d 127, 136 (Maine 1999)). The court
looked to Maine’s decision in Bagley to address an argument made regarding the Supreme
Court’s interpretation of the Establishment Clause in Agostini. Id. Maine’s Supreme Court
noted that the Establishment Clause does not have a role in requiring government assistance
to make practice of religion more available or easier. Id. The district court also addressed
Davey’s Free Exercise Clause argument. Id. Davey asked the court to apply the holdings of
Sherbert v. Verner and its progeny to questions of school funding. Id. The court declined to
apply the case holdings outside of unemployment compensation. Id. Ultimately, the court
held there was no Free Exercise Clause violation because there is no right to have
Washington fund religious instruction. Id.
150

151
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On appeal, a panel for the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
declared the scholarship program unconstitutional. 152 The Ninth Circuit
approached precedent from a different direction, beginning with Church of
Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah. 153 The court stated that non-neutral
and not generally applicable laws burdening religious practice must advance
compelling interests and “be narrowly tailored in pursuit of those
interests.” 154 In addressing Washington’s scholarship program, the court
found that the program lacked neutrality because free exercise encompasses
the right to be a minister and Washington’s program, on its face, disqualifies
clergy. 155 The Ninth Circuit’s panel also addressed the free speech
arguments made by Davey, finding that the program was viewpoint based
because it discriminates against religious ideas. 156
After establishing that Washington’s scholarship program was
facially discriminatory, the court addressed the compelling interest
requirement. The court did not recognize Washington’s interest in
achieving greater separation of church and state because that interest is
already ensured under the federal Establishment Clause and the degree of
separation is limited by the Free Exercise Clause. 157
The Supreme Court approached its analysis of the case
differently. While the Ninth Circuit analyzed the case within the parameters
of the Free Exercise Clause alone, the Supreme Court made its decision
within the “play in the joints” between the Free Exercise Clause and the
Establishment Clause. 158 Rejecting the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit’s panel,
the Supreme Court distinguished the circumstances of Locke from those of
Lukumi because Washington’s scholarship program did not impose
criminal or civil sanctions on any type of religious service or right; 159 it did
not deny ministers the ability to participate in the political affairs of the
community; and it did not require students to choose between religious
beliefs and receipt of a government benefit. 160
152
153

154
155
156
157

Locke, 540 U.S. at 718.

Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
Davey v. Locke, 299 F.3d 748, 753 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 546).

Id.
Id. at 756.
Id. at 759.

Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 719 (2004).
Id. at 720. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals looked to the Supreme Court’s decision
in Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah for guidance in determining the level of scrutiny
necessary. Davey, 299 F.3d at 753 (citing Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah,
508 U.S. 520 (1993)). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found that Lukumi was implicated
because the Washington state scholarship policy referred to religion on its face and thus was
not neutral or generally applicable. Id.
Locke, 540 U.S. at 720–21.
158
159

160
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Next, the Rehnquist majority addressed Justice Scalia’s dissent.
Justice Scalia argued that by providing generally available benefits as part of
a baseline, which includes training for secular professions, the State must
also fund training for religious professions. 161 The majority rejected this
argument, noting that religious education for ministry shares no counterpart
with respect to other callings or professions, as majoring in devotional
theology is not only an academic pursuit, but also a religious calling. 162
In addressing the Washington Constitution’s anti-establishment
interests, the Court first looked to tradition and history. 163 The Court
discussed a history of popular uprisings against use of taxpayer funds to
support churches or church leaders. 164 The Court also discussed the
existence of anti-establishment clauses in a number of other state
constitutions, citing Georgia, Delaware, Kentucky, Vermont, Tennessee,
and Ohio as examples. 165 In its analysis, the Court pointed to the fact that
Washington’s scholarship program included religion in its benefits by
allowing students to attend religious schools and to take devotional theology
classes. 166
Thus, American history and Washington’s interests adequately
supported the Court’s conclusion that anti-establishment clause and
scholarship program did not suggest religious animus. 167 The Court held that
the program was a permissible exercise of the play in the joints; “[i]f any
room exists between the two Religion Clauses, it must be here.” 168

E.

Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia v. Comer

169

In Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia v. Comer, the Roberts
Court found that the Missouri Department of Natural Resources’
playground resurfacing program was unconstitutional for categorically
disqualifying churches and other religious organizations from receiving
grants. 170
The Missouri Department of Natural Resources offered state
grants to help schools, daycare centers, and nonprofit entities purchase

Id. at 721.
Id.
Id. at 722–23.
Id.
Id. at 723. Each cited constitution “prohibited any tax dollars from supporting the clergy.”
Id.
Id. at 724–25.
Id. at 725.
See id.
161
162
163
164
165

166
167
168
169
170

Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012 (2017).

Id. at 2017, 2025.
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rubber playground surfaces. 171 Due to limited funding, grants were awarded
based on several criteria, like “poverty level of the population in the
surrounding area, and the applicant’s plan to promote recycling.” 172 The
program expressly denied grants to applicants owned or controlled by
churches, religious sects, or other religious entities 173 as compelled by
Missouri’s Constitution, which provides that money cannot be “taken from
the public treasury, directly or indirectly, in aid of any church, sect or
denomination of religion . . . .” 174
Trinity Lutheran operated a preschool and daycare center on its
property that admitted students of any religion. 175 Trinity Lutheran’s daycare
and preschool center ranked fifth among forty-four applicants for a grant
the year it applied for playground funding but was deemed “categorically
ineligible” because it was operated by a church. 176
Trinity Lutheran sued alleging that the Missouri Department of
Natural Resources violated its free exercise rights by failing to approve its
grant application. 177 Trinity Lutheran sought declaratory judgment and
injunctive relief prohibiting the Missouri Department of Natural Resources
from discrimination against Trinity Lutheran in grant applications. 178
The district court dismissed Trinity Lutheran’s complaint, 179
beginning its analysis by addressing Article 1, section 7 of the Missouri
Constitution. 180 The district court concluded that section 7 “clearly
prohibit[ed] public money from, directly or indirectly, going to aid a church,
sect, or denomination of religions” and that the denial of Trinity Lutheran’s
application for a grant could not be considered discrimination. 181
Next, the court addressed Trinity Lutheran’s free exercise
claim. 182 Trinity Lutheran argued that the decision to deny its application
“targeted Trinity [Lutheran] for disparate treatment on the basis of
religion.” 183 The court then looked to Locke. 184 Trinity Lutheran argued that
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178

Id. at 2017.
Id.
Id.

MO. CONST. art. 1, § 7.

Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2017.
Id. at 2018.
Id.
Id.

Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Pauley, 976 F. Supp. 2d 1137, 1140 (W.D.
Mo. 2013).
Id. at 1141.
Id. at 1145.
Id. at 1146.

179

180
181
182
183
184

Id.
Id. at 1147. Trinity Lutheran cited to a number of cases to support its free exercise claim,

however, the district court noted that each case involved an ordinance or regulation that
directly prohibited or restricted the exercise of a religious practice. Id. at 1146.
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it was distinguishable from Locke because that program prohibited funding
of religious training of clergy and there is “a longstanding aversion to using
tax dollars to fund the ministry,” which clearly invokes the state’s antiestablishment interests. 185
The district court rejected Trinity Lutheran’s reasoning, finding
that the same anti-establishment concerns were raised because “Trinity
[Lutheran] ultimately [sought] the direct payment of government funds to a
religious institution.” 186 The court first noted that programs of “true private
choice,” where aid reaches religious schools due to “genuine and
independent choices of private individuals,” are permissible. 187 Next, the
court added that states may not grant aid to religious schools where the aid
is, in essence, “a direct subsidy to the religious school.” 188
The court distinguished Trinity Lutheran’s situation from
precedent because Trinity Lutheran did not claim that its playground was
used “exclusively for secular purposes.” 189 The district court also added that
using taxpayer funds for Trinity Lutheran’s playground, “no matter how
innocuous, raises Establishment Clause concerns.” 190
A panel for the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the
district court’s dismissal. 191 The court began by discussing Trinity Lutheran’s
federal constitutional claims. 192 The court noted that Trinity Lutheran
sought the “unprecedented ruling—that a state constitution violates the First
Amendment and Equal Protection Clause if it bars the grant of public funds
to a church.” 193 As to the federal claims, the court affirmed the district court’s
dismissal for failure to state a claim because Missouri’s Constitutional
provision did not conflict with the First Amendment’s Equal Protection
Clause. 194
Next, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed Trinity
Lutheran’s Missouri constitutional claim that the Department of Natural
Resources denial of their grant “violated the second clause of Article I, § 7,
185
186
187
188

Id. at 1148.
Id.
Id. at 1149 (quoting Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 649 (2002)).
Id. (quoting Witters v. Washington Dep’t of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 487

(1986)).
Id. at 1150.
Id. (citing Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 780
(1973)).
Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Pauley, 788 F.3d 779, 781 (8th Cir. 2015).
Id. at 783. The court noted that Trinity Lutheran alleged that the Department of Natural
Resources violated the Free Exercise Clause by targeting religion for disparate treatment;
violated the Establishment Clause because the denial was hostile to religion; and violated
Equal Protection by discriminating against religious day care organizations and centers. Id.
189
190

191
192

193
194

Id.
Id. at 784–85.
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which forbids” discrimination against the church. 195 The court affirmed the
dismissal of the claim because the pleadings demonstrated that the grant
from the Department of Natural Resources would aid Trinity Lutheran and
its ministry as defined by Missouri law. 196
On appeal, the Supreme Court took a different approach and
began its analysis with the Free Exercise Clause and recent precedent. 197 The
Court noted that denial of a generally available benefit solely on account of
religious identity imposes a penalty that must be justified by a state interest
of the highest order. 198
Next, the Court addressed Missouri’s policy, finding that “[it]
expressly discriminates against otherwise eligible recipients by disqualifying
them from a public benefit solely because of their religious character.” 199
The Court analogized Trinity Lutheran’s case to McDaniel v.
Paty, where the Court struck down a statute that disqualified ministers from
serving as delegates to Tennessee’s constitutional convention. 200 The Court
noted that like McDaniel, Missouri’s program gave Trinity Lutheran a
choice: “participate in an otherwise available benefit program or remain a
religious institution.” 201 Framed this way, the Court added that the condition
of the benefit in this way “punished the free exercise of religion.” 202
The Missouri Department of Natural Resources argued that it
only declined funding and did not prohibit Trinity Lutheran from engaging
in religious conduct or otherwise exercising their religious rights. 203
However, the Court rejected that argument because Missouri’s program
indirectly coerced and penalized the free exercise of religion. 204
The Court distinguished the facts of Trinity Lutheran from
Locke, because unlike Locke, Trinity Lutheran was denied a grant because
it is a church. 205 In Locke, Davey was denied a scholarship not because of
who he was, but because of what he wanted to do.
As to the justifications offered by Missouri’s Department of
Natural Resources to support the program, the Court noted that a “policy
Id. at 786.
Id. at 787. The Eighth Circuit distinguished the facts of Trinity Lutheran from Americans
United v. Rogers. Id. (citing Americans v. Rogers, 538 S.W.2d 711, 718 (Mo. 1976). The
court noted that unlike in Americans United, the program at issue in Trinity Lutheran’s case
195
196

was not designed and implemented for the benefit of the students, but rather was the benefit
of the institutions. Id. at 787–88.
Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2019 (2017).
Id. (quoting McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 628 (1978)).
Id. at 2021.
Id. at 2020 (citing McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 627).
Id. at 2021–22.
Id. at 2022.
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205

Id.
Id. (citing Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 450 (1988)).
Id. at 2023–24.
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preference for skating as far as possible from religious establishment
concerns” could not qualify as a compelling interest. 206
III.

MONTANA’S NO-AID CLAUSE AND THE ESPINOZA CASE

On January 22, 2020, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments
for Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue. 207 The issue was whether
a state may subsidize private secular education and not private religious
education. 208 Montana argued that the program’s structure protected against
an Establishment Clause violation. The parents argued that the structure of
the program violated their Free Exercise Clause rights, 209 and the Court may
find that Espinoza fits somewhere within the precedent discussed above.
This next section discusses the decisions by the Montana state court and
Montana Supreme Court.

A.

History and Background

Montana’s Legislature enacted a tax credit program in 2015
entitled, “Tax Credit for Qualified Education Contributions.” 210 The
program gave taxpayers a tax credit for either providing supplemental
funding to public schools or donating to the program. 211 By donating to the
program, a taxpayer would receive a dollar-for-dollar tax credit up to $150
for donating to a student scholarship organization in Montana that met three
additional criteria. 212 The organization must be federal income tax-exempt;
allocate no less than ninety percent of its revenue to scholarships for
students to attend any qualified education provider; and provide educational
scholarships to students without limiting access to a single school. 213
Initially, the definition of qualified education providers included
religious schools. 214 However, this was identified as a “constitutional
deficiency” because of Article X, section 6 of Montana’s Constitution, its
No-Aid Clause. 215 Under Article X, section 6, aid from the legislature,
counties, cities, towns, school districts, and public corporations is prohibited
206
207

Id. at 2024.
Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue, SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 22, 2020),

https://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/espinoza-v-montana-department-of-revenue/
[https://perma.cc/C9B6-GWN6].
Espinoza v. Montana Dep’t of Rev., 140 S. Ct. 2246, 2251 (2020).
Id. at 2251–52.
Espinoza v. Montana Dep’t of Rev., 435 P.3d 603, 606 (Mont. 2018) (citing MONT. CODE
ANN. §§ 15-30-3101–3114 (West 2015)).
208
209
210

211
212
213
214
215

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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to sectarian schools. 216 Thus, in implementing the tax credit program, the
Montana Department of Revenue adopted Rule 1, 217 which excluded from
the tax credit program any qualified education provider “controlled in whole
or in part by any church, religious sect, or denomination.” 218
A group of parents whose children attended private religious
school in Montana challenged Rule 1 in district court, arguing that excluding
private religious schools from the definition of qualified education providers
violated their free exercise rights under Montana’s Constitution and the U.S.
Constitution. 219 The Montana Department of Revenue argued that the tax
credit program in its entirety was unconstitutional and, additionally, that the
rule properly restricted the program from providing aid to sectarian
schools. 220
The district court focused its analysis on the tax credits. 221 The
court concluded that the credits did not involve the expenditure of money
from the treasury, so including private religious schools would not violate
Article X, section 6 of Montana’s Constitution. 222 The district court granted
summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and enjoined the Montana
Department of Revenue from applying or enforcing Rule 1. 223

B.

Montana Supreme Court’s Decision

The Montana Supreme Court held that the tax credit program
violated the Montana Constitution by providing aid to sectarian schools, and
that the tax credit program, in its entirety, was unconstitutional. 224
The Montana Supreme Court framed the issue as whether the tax
credit program violated Article X, section 6 of Montana’s Constitution. 225
The court considered Article X, section 6 of Montana’s Constitution as
existing within an even narrower “play in the joints” between the Free
Exercise and Establishment Clauses because it drew a more stringent line
than what is required by the U.S. Constitution. 226
First, Montana’s Supreme Court analyzed the constitutional
provision at issue. 227 The court concluded that the plain language and the
216
217
218
219
220
221
222
223
224
225
226
227

MONT. CONST. art. X, § 6.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 15-30-3102 (West 2015).
Espinoza, 435 P.3d at 607 (citing MONT. CODE ANN. § 15-30-3102 (West 2015)).
Id. at 608.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 615.
Id. at 609.
Id. at 608–09.
Id. at 609–11.
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Constitutional Convention Transcripts demonstrated that the clear
objective of Article X, section 6 was to “firmly prohibit aid to sectarian
schools.” 228
Next, the court addressed the argument that the tax credit
program was unconstitutional. 229 The Montana Department of Revenue
argued that the program violated Article X, section 6 and that Rule 1 was
needed to cure that defect. 230 The court found that the program aided
sectarian schools when it enacted the program because it permitted the
indirect payment of tuition at private, religiously-affiliated schools. 231 The
court noted that when a parent donated under the program, they received a
dollar-for-dollar tax credit, so if their child also received a tuition scholarship
from the organization they donated to, the amount owed in tuition to that
school would decrease. 232 Thus, the legislature would indirectly pay up to
$150 of a student’s tuition at a private religious school by allowing the
student’s parents to receive a tax credit instead of paying that amount in
tuition. 233
The court then addressed Rule 1, which the Montana
Department of Revenue enacted to correct the constitutional defect in the
tax credit program. 234 The court noted that an administrative agency may not
“transform an unconstitutional statute into a constitutional statute with an
administrative rule.” 235 The court explained that it is the legislature’s
responsibility to enact statutes that comply with Montana’s Constitution. 236
The court concluded that the tax credit program was unconstitutional and
that the Montana Department of Revenue exceeded the scope of its
authority by enacting Rule 1. 237

C.

United States Supreme Court’s Decision

In a monumental Free Exercise and Establishment Clause case,
though without any religious monument, the Supreme Court held that the
Montana scholarship program unlawfully discriminated against religious
schools by excluding them from a tax benefit. 238 The majority’s decision
marks a new and dangerous chapter for separation between church and
228
229
230
231
232
233
234
235
236
237
238

Id. at 611.
Id. at 611–14.
Id. at 611.
Id. at 612.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 614–15.
Id. at 615.
Id.
Id.

Espinoza v. Montana Dep’t of Rev., 140 S. Ct. 2246, 2251 (2020).
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state. In Espinoza, the majority narrowed the “play in the joints” to a single
point. 239 Though, like in Locke, if any room were to exist between the
Religion Clauses, it should have been here. 240 This section begins by
discussing the majority opinion. Then, this section addresses the
concurrences and the dissents of this case.

1.

Chief Justice Roberts and the Majority

The majority, penned by Chief Justice Roberts, began by
addressing the general framework for the Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment. 241 The majority noted that it has historically recognized a “play
in the joints” between the two Religion Clauses, referencing Trinity
Lutheran and Locke. 242 However, in continuing its analysis, the majority
pivoted away from the “play in the joints” completely and placed the
argument solely within the Free Exercise Clause. 243 The Court framed the
issue as “whether the Free Exercise Clause precluded the Montana
Supreme Court from applying Montana’s no-aid provision to bar religious
schools from the scholarship program.” 244
In determining which level of scrutiny must apply, the majority
broadened the free exercise right, misinterpreting its narrow decision in
Trinity Lutheran. The majority explained that “disqualifying otherwise
eligible recipients from a public benefit ‘solely because of their religious
character’ imposes ‘a penalty on the free exercise of religion.’” 245 However,
this grossly simplifies the Court’s past decisions. The Court then added that
where a church is discriminated against simply because of what it is, there is
a violation of the free exercise right. 246 Past cases involving the “play in the
Espinoza v. Montana Dep’t of Rev., 435 P.3d 603, 608 (Mont. 2018) (quoting Walz v. Tax
Comm’n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970)).
See id. at 2292 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 725 (2004)).
Id. at 2254.
Id. (citing Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2019
(2017)).
239

240
241
242

Id.
Id.
Id. at 2255 (quoting Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012,
2021 (2017)). Here, Chief Justice Roberts’ statement relies heavily on Trinity Lutheran, a
decision he also penned. Notably, the majority decision in Trinity Lutheran was limited by
243
244
245

a footnote: “[t]his case involves express discrimination based on religious identity with respect
to playground resurfacing. We do not address religious uses of funding or other forms of
discrimination.” Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2024
n.3 (2017). Perhaps Chief Justice Roberts ignored this footnote with the intention of
broadening the case’s holding in the future, or perhaps he simply forgot.
See Espinoza, 140 S. Ct. at 2251 (quoting Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2016) (“Because
of that policy, an otherwise eligible church-owned preschool was denied a grant to resurface
its playground. Missouri’s policy discriminated against the Church ‘simply because of what it
is—a church.’”).
246
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joints” focused on the use of funds in finding infringement. 247 The Court
previously asked whether the funds were used for actual religious
instruction, like the salaries of teachers, or “neutral” things like playground
equipment. 248 The Court in Espinoza ignored those qualifications. 249 Here,
the majority held that where a state subsidizes some private education, it
must fund all private education. 250 Under this new precedent, it is now,
arguably, an infringement of the Free Exercise Clause to offer any public
benefit with religious use limitations.
Next, the majority addressed the Montana Department of
Revenue’s argument that Locke v. Davey governed the case. 251 The majority
distinguished Espinoza from Locke in two ways. First, the Court noted that
in Locke the state of Washington chose not to fund a distinct category of
instruction. 252 Washington’s scholarship program allowed funds to be used
at religious schools, just not for certain types of religious study. 253 The Court
explained that Montana’s no-aid provision did not specify or exclude a type
of religious course or instruction, but rather barred aid to all religious
schools. 254 Again, this departs from past precedent. In Nyquist, the Court
struck down a tax credit that flowed to parents because it furthered sectarian
education. 255 Here, the majority separated religious education from a
religious school. Second, the Court pointed to a “historical and substantial”
state interest in not funding training of clergy. 256 The Court explained that
“no comparable ‘historic and substantial’ tradition supports Montana’s
decision to disqualify religious schools from government aid.” 257 The Court
focused only on the early 1800s tradition of funding religious and
nonreligious schools, ignoring the general tradition against state support for
religious schools in the late 1800s. 258 It appears that rather than turning a
blind eye to history, the Court simply looked back with a wink, opting only
to see the portion of America’s history that supported the majority
opinion. 259
247
248

See, e.g., Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2022; Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 719 (2004).
See Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2016; Locke, 540 U.S. at 724; Lemon v. Kurtzman,

403 U.S. 602, 607 (1971) (holding that two statutory programs providing financial support
by way of reimbursement of salaries were unconstitutional).
Espinoza, 140 S. Ct. at 2255.
See id. at 2261.
See id. at 2257.
Id. (quoting Locke, 540 U.S. at 715).
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251
252
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255
256
257
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Id.
Id.

Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 790 (1973).

Espinoza, 140 S. Ct. at 2257.
Id. at 2258.
Id.
See generally id. at 2259.
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Then, the majority applied strict scrutiny to Montana’s
scholarship program. The Montana Department of Revenue contended
that the no-aid provision promoted religious freedom, protected the
religious liberty of taxpayers, and kept government out of religious
operations. 260 The Supreme Court noted that advancements in religious
liberty are not enough to justify the infringement of First Amendment
Rights. 261 The majority also noted that the infringement affected religious
schools and adherents, burdening the religious schools and the families
wishing to send their children to those schools. 262 The Court stated that
Montana’s no-aid provision cut families off from otherwise available
benefits if they chose a religious private school. 263 In applying strict scrutiny,
the Court only scrutinized the arguments made by the Montana Department
of Revenue and not the scholarship program itself. 264 As previously
explained, the program gave taxpayers tax credit for either providing
supplemental funding to public schools or donating to the program. 265 A
taxpayer would receive a dollar-for-dollar tax credit up to $150 for donating
to a student scholarship organization in Montana that met three additional
criteria. 266
The majority oversimplified and overcomplicated the situation.
While parents may not receive a dollar-for-dollar tax credit up to $150 for
their donation, a parent may still choose to send their child to a religious
school. 267 In addition, by donating to a scholarship program, there is no
guarantee that their child would benefit from the donation. 268 It seems,
though, that the majority is treating the tax credit for a donation to a
scholarship program as if it were a tax credit for tuition. This ignores the
critical third party: the student scholarship organization, and wrongfully
presumes that any person that donates has a child that may receive a
scholarship because their parent donated.
The majority concluded with a Supremacy Clause argument,
holding that the Montana Supreme Court violated the Supremacy Clause
by striking down a program that did not align with the State Constitution
when the constitutional provision was in direct conflict with the Free
Exercise Clause. 269 The Court explained that the Montana Supreme Court
should have started its analysis with the Free Exercise Clause, as federal law
260
261
262
263
264
265
266
267
268
269

See id. at 2260.
See id.
See id. at 2261.
See id.
See id. at 2260.

Espinoza v. Montana Dep’t of Rev., 435 P.3d 603, 606 (Mont. 2018).

See id.
See Espinoza, 140 S. Ct. at 2261.
See Espinoza, 435 P.3d at 612–13.
Espinoza, 140 S. Ct. at 2262.
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is supreme. 270 Thus, because Montana’s program violated the Free Exercise
Clause, the Montana Supreme Court should have stopped its analysis of the
program. 271 The Court ended by explaining that the Montana Supreme
Court’s elimination of the program “flowed directly from [its] failure to
follow the dictates of federal law,” and “[could not] be defended.” 272

2.

Concurrences: (1) Justice Thomas joined by Justice Gorsuch; (2)
Justice Alito; and (3) Justice Gorsuch

Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Gorsuch, concurred in the
majority opinion but seized the opportunity to argue for an
accommodationist interpretation of the Establishment Clause. 273 Justice
Thomas explained that the Establishment Clause should only protect
against the imposition of an established religion by the federal
government. 274 He continues to urge the Court away from the Lemon test. 275
Alternatively, Justice Alito’s concurrence focused on the no-aid
provision itself. 276 The majority, without ruling on the validity of no-aid
clauses in general, spent a great deal of its time analyzing Montana’s no-aid
provision. 277 Justice Alito’s concurrence focused on Blaine Amendments,
their nativist viewpoint, and anti-Catholic or anti-Jewish sentiments. 278 The
Blaine Amendment was a proposed amendment to the United States
Constitution, introduced by House Speaker James Blaine. 279 Though the
amendment was not passed at the federal level, several states adopted their
own “Blaine Amendments.” 280 These state constitutional provisions, similar
to Montana’s constitutional provision, bar the use of public funds to aid

270
271
272
273

See id.
See id.
Id.
See id. at 2266 (Thomas, J., concurring). Accommodationists assert that the Establishment

Clause permits government some latitude in recognizing and accommodating religion’s
central role in our society. VALERIE C. BRANNON, CONG. RSCH. SERV., LSB10259, SUPREME
COURT MAY RECONSIDER ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE IN CHALLENGE TO
CROSS
DISPLAY:
PART
ONE
2
(2019),
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/LSB/LSB10259
[https://perma.cc/679Y6LWA].

Id.
See id. at 2267.
See id. at 2268–74 (Alito, J., concurring).
Id. at 2246 (majority opinion).
See id. at 2269–70 (Alito, J., concurring).
See id.
Erica Smith, Blaine Amendments and the Unconstitutionality of Excluding Religious
Options From School Choice Programs, 18 FED. SOC. R. 88, 90 (2017).
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sectarian institutions. 281 Justice Alito, likely, would have preferred a majority
opinion striking down all Blaine Amendments. 282
Justice Gorsuch’s concurrence focused on the distinction between
religious status and religious use. 283 Justice Gorsuch noted that he questioned
the characterization of discrimination in Trinity Lutheran and in
Espinoza. 284 He explained that the record in Espinoza discussed religious
activity, uses, and conduct in depth. 285 He next framed the issue as two
questions. 286 The first based on status, asks whether Montana sought to
prevent religious parents and schools from participating. 287 The second,
based on use, asks whether Montana aimed to bar public benefits from
being used to support religious education. 288 However, Justice Gorsuch
arrived at the same conclusion as the majority. 289 Justice Gorsuch ultimately
concluded that “[c]alling it discrimination on the basis of religious status or
religious activity makes no difference: [i]t is unconstitutional all the same.” 290

3.

Dissents: (1) Justice Ginsburg joined by Justice Kagan; (2) Justice
Breyer joined in part by Justice Kagan; and (3) Justice Sotomayor

Justice Ginsburg’s dissent, joined by Justice Kagan, argued that
because the Montana Supreme Court’s decision did not discriminate,
Petitioners’ Free Exercise claim fails. 291 Justice Ginsburg found the decision
neutral because the Montana Supreme Court struck down the program in
its entirety, so both secular and sectarian schools were ineligible for
benefits. 292 She explained that the “Court has consistently refused to treat
neutral government action as unconstitutional solely because it fails to
benefit religious exercise.” 293
Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Kagan in part, discussed the “play
in the joints.” 294 Justice Breyer wrote that he feared the majority’s approach
because the conclusion risked the “entanglement and conflict that the
281
282

See id.
Id. at 2274 (“And even if Montana had done more to address its no-aid provision’s past,

that would of course do nothing to resolve the bias inherent in the Blaine Amendments
among the 17 states.”).
See id. at 2275–78 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
See id. at 2275.
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See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 2278.
Id.
See id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
See id. at 2279.
See id.
Id. at 2281 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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Religion Clauses are intended to prevent.” 295 Justice Breyer framed the
question in Espinoza, not as whether the Establishment Clause forbids
Montana from subsidizing religious education, but rather whether the Free
Exercise Clause requires Montana to do so. 296 Placing the argument squarely
within the “play in the joints,” Justice Breyer would have Locke control the
decision in Espinoza. 297 Justice Breyer noted that “[i]f, for 250 years, [the
Court has] drawn a line at forcing taxpayers to pay the salaries of those who
teach their faith from the pulpit, I do not see how we can today require
Montana to adopt a different view respecting those who teach it in the
classroom.” 298
Finally, Justice Sotomayor’s dissenting opinion explained that the
majority decision slighted precedent and weakened the separation of church
and state. 299 Justice Sotomayor, similar to Justice Ginsburg, noted that the
Free Exercise Clause claim was not cognizable because there was no
differential treatment or coercion. 300 She then addressed the majority’s
Supremacy Clause argument, explaining that the majority departed from
precedent in implying a federal question not raised by the parties. 301 Justice
Sotomayor concluded by addressing the majority’s reasoning, noting that its
decision “risks reading the Establishment Clause out of the Constitution.” 302
IV.

FUNDAMENTAL FUNDS

The Supreme Court’s past Establishment Clause and Free
Exercise Clause decisions did not pave a clear pathway—or a path at all. This
section begins by comparing Espinoza to the cases discussed above. Next,
this section advances the argument that Espinoza should not have been
decided under Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause precedent,
but elsewhere, because funds are simply not fundamental.

A.

Where Espinoza Fits

Montana’s Supreme Court took a unique approach to addressing
the constitutionality of the program, analyzing it exclusively under the State’s
Constitution. Though the Supreme Court could have decided Espinoza
within the narrow confines of past precedent related to scholarship
295
296
297
298
299
300
301

Id.
Id. at 2283.
Id. at 2284.
Id. at 2288.
See id. at 2292 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
See id. at 2293.
See id. 2294 (“The Court typically declines to read state-court decisions as impliedly

resolving federal questions, especially ones not raised by the parties.”).
See id. at 2296.
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programs and religious schools, Trinity Lutheran’s footnote was instructive:
precedent implicating government funds and religious entities is extremely
limited in scope. 303 Given the differences between the tax credit program at
issue in Espinoza, and the related schemes in other Religion Clause cases,
it is evident that the Court should not try to make the facts fit.
The Supreme Court upheld Ohio’s scholarship program, 304 but
struck down New York’s. 305 The Court distinguished Ohio’s program from
the program in New York for two reasons: (1) the New York program only
provided benefits to private schools; and (2) the Court in the New York
case, Nyquist, reserved judgment with respect to public assistance made
available to both public and private schools. 306 However, even in deciding
the Ohio program case, Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, the Court limited the
reach of the decision by finding the program “neutral with respect to
religion” because it “provide[d] benefits directly to a wide spectrum of
individuals, defined only by financial need and residence” and “permit[ted]
such individuals to exercise genuine choice among options public and
private, secular and religious.” 307 The Court declared the program one of
“true private choice.” 308 Where Espinoza differs is that the funds at issue
were not tuition credits or reimbursement, and there was no “true private
choice.”
Again, in Trinity Lutheran, the Supreme Court drew a narrow
distinction between the facts at hand and past precedent. The key
differentiator was that Trinity Lutheran required the organization to choose
whether to be a church or religiously affiliated, whereas Locke required
Davey to choose, not whether to be religious, but what to study. 309 However,
framed differently, the choice in Trinity Lutheran could be simpler than
that. The choice is whether to have a rubber playground or not; or whether
to apply for governmental funding or not. Regardless, the key seems to be
the type of choice the individual or organization must make. Though, there
may be an argument about the difference in use of the funds—the type of
choice is sufficient enough to distinguish Espinoza.
In Espinoza, the issue is much further removed from the religious
choices at issue in Trinity and Locke. The parents in Espinoza are not
See supra note 245.
See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 662–63 (2002).
See Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 798 (1973).
536 U.S. at 661 (citing Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 782–83 n.38).
Zelman, 536 U.S. at 662.
Id.
Compare Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2023–
24 (2017), with Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 724–25 (2004) (in Locke an individual could
303
304
305
306
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308
309

not receive funding while pursuing a devotional theology degree, but the individual could be
religious and receive funding, in Trinity Lutheran to receive funding an organization could
not be religious or religiously affiliated).
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choosing between sending their children to religious schools or not and they
are not choosing between being religious or not. The parents in Espinoza
choose to donate or not. There is no guarantee that, if they donate, their
children will receive scholarships to attend a private religious institution. In
fact, the tax credit program prohibited donors from directing their
contributions to a specific parent, guardian, or even school. 310
There is no need to fit Espinoza within the margins of the “play
in the joints” precedent. Instead, Espinoza should be decided within
precedent established by cases involving access to funding as there is no
fundamental right infringed.

B.

Fundamental Rights Analysis: No Infringement

While the Supreme Court does not recognize the right to public
education as a fundamental right, 311 the plaintiffs in Espinoza asked the court
to recognize an analogous right—a fundamental right to funding private
religious education. 312 Framed as a violation of the petitioners’ free exercise
rights, the alleged infringement was a denial of public funding to pay for
private religious education. 313 This lack of access to public funds is not an
infringement of the free exercise right. Thus, Montana’s No-Aid Clause
must be subject only to rational basis review.
Under the Free Exercise Clause there is a fundamental right to be
free from unequal treatment due to religious status. 314 Therefore, in
legislating between the Free Exercise Clause and Establishment Clause, a
state may not support any specific church or exclude any individuals due to
their religious beliefs or lack thereof. 315 Following the Madisonian view, this
understanding of the fundamental free exercise right diffuses and

Espinoza v. Montana Dep’t of Rev., 435 P.3d 603, 606 (Mont. 2018).
San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973) (“Education, of course,
is not among the rights afforded explicit protection under our Federal Constitution. Nor do
we find any basis for saying it is implicitly so protected.”).
See Reply Brief for Petitioners, supra note 7, at 23–24 (explaining the history and tradition
of similar no-aid clauses and asking the court to end the national tradition of religious
discrimination).
See MONT. CONST. art. X, § 6(1) (West, Westlaw through 2019) (“The legislature,
counties, cities, towns, school districts, and public corporations shall not make any direct or
indirect appropriation or payment from any public fund or monies, or any grant of lands or
other property for any sectarian purpose or to aid any church, school, academy, seminary,
college, university, or other literary or scientific institution, controlled in whole or in part by
any church, sect, or denomination.”).
See Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2019 (2017);
Everson v. Board of Educ. of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947).
See Everson, 330 U.S. at 16.
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decentralizes power to prevent dominance by any particular sect or
religion. 316
Since there is freedom to exercise religion without interference
from the state, it follows that the right to free exercise includes the option of
parents to choose to send their children to private religious schools. In
choosing a private religious school, a parent exercises their religious
freedom. Again, there is an important line to be drawn with regard to free
exercise. The fundamental right of free exercise is absolute with regard to
beliefs. 317
However, the right to religiously motivated conduct is not
absolute. 318 For example, the Supreme Court upheld a law forbidding
polygamy in Reynolds v. United States stating that Congress could “reach
actions which were in violation of social duties or subversive of good
order.” 319 In Goldman v. Weinberger, the Court denied the claim of a Jewish
Air Force doctor who said his religion required him to wear a yarmulke in
violation of the military dress code. 320 Like Reynolds, only the conduct in
Goldman was being regulated. 321 In both instances, the parties were still free
to exercise their own beliefs. 322
At stake in cases regarding No-Aid Clauses and raising issues
related to the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses, are schemes
providing benefits to taxpayers. 323 These schemes, like Reynolds and
Goldman, concern regulation of religiously motivated conduct, not the
exercise of beliefs. 324 The petitioners’ contention that the No-Aid Clause
violates their right to free exercise rests on the assertion that, without these
funds, the petitioners would not be able to choose to send their children to
private religious schools. 325 In Espinoza, the program struck down under
Montana’s No-Aid Clause was, in essence, a tuition credit. Individuals
received tax credits for donating to nonprofit student scholarship
organizations. 326 Then, these organizations used the donations to fund
316
317
318

See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 17, at 1723.

Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 603 (1961).

Id. (citing Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303–04, 306 (1940)).

Reynolds v. U.S., 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878). The Court noted that polygamy had consistently
been treated as an offense against society throughout history.
Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986) (acknowledging a need to defer to the
military).
See id. at 510.
See id.; Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 166.
See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 645 (2002) (explaining the types of
assistance provided to parents); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist,
413 U.S. 756, 762 (1973) (describing the financial aid programs for nonpublic elementary
and secondary schools which included tuition reimbursement and grants).
See Goldman, 475 U.S. at 503; Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164.
Reply Brief for Petitioners, supra note 7, at 7.
Brief of Respondents, supra note 10, at 3.
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scholarships for qualified education providers. 327 Despite various degrees of
separation, the program operated to lessen tuition expenses for parents
choosing to send their children to private religious institutions. In fact, the
petitioners relied on the tax credit to create financial aid to allow them to
send their children to these religious private schools. 328 Without the
program, the parents in Espinoza could experience financial hardship in
sending their children to religious private schools.
However, the Court has established that fundamental rights do
not include the right to receive government funding in the exercise of that
right. 329 As Justice Powell explained in Maher v. Roe, a fundamental right
“implies no limitation on the authority of a State to make a value judgment
. . . and to implement that judgment by the allocation of public funds.” 330
Justice Stewart echoed Justice Powell’s reasoning four years later in Harris
v. McRae, stating that the fundamental right of abortion “does not confer an
entitlement to such funds as may be necessary to realize all the advantages
of that freedom.” 331 In both instances, the Court found that while the ability
to finance abortions may have become more difficult given the specific
legislation, the legislation did not infringe the fundamental right to
abortion. 332
Similarly, while the Court recognizes a fundamental right to
marry, 333 it has upheld the constitutionality of laws that may, in effect,
discourage marriage. 334 In Califano v. Jobst, the Court upheld a provision of
the Social Security Act that terminated benefits for disabled children
(classified as wage earners’ dependent) when those children got married. 335

327

Id.

Reply Brief for Petitioners, supra note 7, at 7.
See generally Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 317–18 (1980) (“Although the liberty
protected by the Due Process Clause affords protection against unwarranted government
interference with freedom of choice in the context of certain personal decisions, it does not
confer an entitlement to such funds as may be necessary to realize all the advantages of that
freedom.”); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 473–74 (1977) (“Roe did not declare an unqualified
‘constitutional right to an abortion’ . . . . Rather, the right protects the woman from unduly
burdensome interference with her freedom to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy.”);
Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 447 (1977) (holding that the Medicaid Act did not require states
to fund nontherapeutic first-trimester abortions as participants in the joint federal and state
program); Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519, 521 (1977) (holding that the City of St. Louis did
not violate any constitutional rights in electing to provide public financing for childbirth
hospital services but not for nontherapeutic abortions).
Maher, 432 U.S. at 473–74.
Harris, 448 U.S. at 318.
See id. at 318; Maher, 432 U.S. at 473–74.
Loving v. Virginia, 87 S. Ct. 1817, 1824 (1967).
See Bowen v. Owens, 476 U.S. 340, 350 (1986); Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47, 58 (1977).
See Califano, 434 U.S. at 58.
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The Court acknowledged that the exception could have an impact on a
desire to marry, but ultimately held that the provision was constitutional. 336
In Bowen v. Owens, the Court again recognized the fundamental
right to marry, but allowed the denial of funds. 337 In Owens, widows of wage
earners sued regarding a different provision of the Social Security Act: a
provision denying payment of widow’s benefits to a divorced widow who
remarried. 338 Both cases involved the right to marry—a fundamental right—
but neither provision infringed on that right. Instead, the provisions
financially disincentivized the right, but that is neither a de facto nor de jure
ban on the right to marriage.
Thus, it follows that in a case involving a No-Aid Clause, the right
to free exercise of religion does not include a right to public funds to realize
all the advantages of that freedom. Parents, like the parents in Espinoza, are
able to send their children to whichever school they choose. They may
exercise their religion in opting to send their children to private religious
schools, or they may send their children to public schools. What the NoAid Clause prevents is funding of that decision. The choice of states like
Montana to enact No-Aid Clauses and prohibit funds for religious education
is not a free exercise infringement. It is a “play in the joints” between the
Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses because funds themselves are not
fundamental.
V.

CONCLUSION

In recognizing the petitioner’s fundamental right to funds for their
private religious institutions, the majority has allowed the walls of the
Establishment Clause to crumble. To require a government to fund private
religious education any time it funds education does not fit within any of the
Framers’ understandings of the relationship between government and
religion. 339 In fact, under the majority’s decision in Espinoza, upholding the
Establishment Clause violates the Free Exercise Clause, except in the (rare)
occasion of a federal government-sponsored religion.
The Court erred in its decision, departing entirely from precedent,
and improperly broadening the Free Exercise Right. Instead, the Montana
Supreme Court’s decision should have been upheld, and the tax credit
program should have been analyzed using rational basis review because
336
337
338
339

Id.
See Bowen, 476 U.S. at 340.
See id. at 343–44.
See CHEMERINKSY, supra note 17, at 1723. Both Evangelists and Jeffersonians would be

bothered by the excessive level of entanglement, with the government involved in religion
and religion involved in government if funding is fundamental. Arguably, this may be a
diffusion of power by requiring the funds to be given to religious institutions, but it is
impossible to imagine a situation where the government allows funds to flow without
attaching strings of some sort.
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there was no infringement of the taxpayer’s fundamental rights. Montana’s
No-Aid Clause and Rule 1 under the tax credit program did not infringe the
parent’s rights to free exercise. By excluding private religious institutions,
Montana properly acted within the “play in the joints” between the Free
Exercise Clause and Establishment Clause because funds themselves are
not fundamental.
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